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17.1 Introduction
High uncertainty and volatility of food prices in the recent years have renewed the
interests of many countries in considering food reserves as an important instrument
in managing food price instability. These reserves come back into the focus of policy
agenda as a result of the huge doubts on the reliability of international trade to
guarantee food supply. The 2008 crisis, in particular, highlighted that low levels of
food stocks make countries vulnerable to excessive price volatility even only with
low levels of supply or demand shocks (Wright 2009).
Countries in Southeast Asia have been using storage-based price stabilization
for decades (Rashid et al. 2007). Grain price stabilization in the Philippines
started in 1960s, carried out by Rice and Corn Administration (RCA) and Rice
and Corn Board (RICOB). In Indonesia, price stabilization is managed by Badan
Urusan Logistik (BULOG), a national food reserve agency created in 1967. At
the regional level, the cooperation on food reserves has been ongoing since the
late 1970s, when the original members of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) established the Agreement on Food Security Reserve (AFSR).
The ASEAN Emergency Rice Reserve (AERR) was created in 1979 with the initial
earmarks of 50,000 tons of rice to serve as the subset of national stocks in addressing
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food emergencies in the region. However, due to small size of the stocks and its
complex release mechanism, the AERR had never really been activated during the
entire operational period of more than a quarter of a century (Dano 2006).
The recent food price crisis affecting almost all countries in the world led to a
new phase of the regional reserve cooperation in Southeast Asia. The ten member
countries of ASEAN, in partnership with China, Japan, and Korea, agreed on the
ASEAN Plus Three Emergency Rice Reserve (APTERR), which entered into force
in July 2012. The APTERR is a permanent reserve scheme which replaces the pilot
project East Asia Emergency Rice Reserve (EAERR), which itself was presented
as a metamorphosis of the AERR. The initial earmark of APTERR is 787,000 tons
of rice, roughly twice the size of von Braun and Torero’s (2008) proposal for a
modest emergency grain reserve of 300,000–500,000 metric tons for the whole
world. However, the APTERR has hardly been tested in practice. Since entering
into force, only 200 tons of rice have been released at the end of 2012 for poverty
alleviation and the malnutrition eradication program in Indonesia, and another 800
tons of rice in early 2014 for typhoon Haiyan victims in the Philippines. Several
other small releases have been made during its pilot phase from 2004 to 2010.1
This study aims to review the storage-based price-stabilization policy in South-
east Asia, both at the national and regional level, and to discuss the prospect of the
policy in the current era of price instability. The remainder of the article is organized
as follows: Sect. 17.2 provides information on ASEAN market structure, which
will discuss the food trade and development of trade cooperation in the region.
Sections 17.3 and 17.4 describe food reserves at the national and regional level in
ASEAN, including a discussion on their cost and benefit. The discussion about food
reserves at the national level will use several countries in ASEAN as examples,
while at the regional level, the discussion will mainly focus on the ASEANC3.2
Section 17.5 analyzes the WTO rules on public stockholding, and the last section
provides the concluding remarks.
17.2 ASEAN Food Market Structure
The recent waves of global food price crisis have affected almost all countries in
the world. ASEAN countries are among those that are hit by the price crisis. Since
2007, the food price index increases have been higher than the consumer price index
increases in the region (Fig. 17.1).
ASEAN countries accounted for 29 % of the total global rice output in 2013,
while maize production in this region accounted only for 4 % of the total global
output. Countries in this region are not traditional producers of wheat and other
1www.apterr.org, accessed on 17 September 2014.
2Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members are: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia,
Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam; Plus Three Countries (C3)
are China, Japan, Rep. Korea.
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Fig. 17.1 General and food price index in Southeast Asia (2000 D 100). Source: FAOSTAT
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Fig. 17.2 World’s rice production in 2013. Source: FAOSTAT
cereals. The countries rely heavily on import for their supply of these commodities.
Most Southeast Asians eat rice as their main staple food. Rice constitutes more than
half of the population’s total calorie intake from cereal. In Thailand and Vietnam,
rice accounts even for more than two-third of their total calorie intake from cereal.3
ASEAN provides a mix of cases. It is home to some of the world’s biggest
producers, consumers, exporters, and importers of rice at the same time. Thailand
and Vietnam are among the biggest rice exporters, whereas Indonesia, Malaysia,
and the Philippines are among the biggest rice importers in the world. However,
Indonesia and the Philippines, with their goals to achieve self-sufficiency, view trade
as the last source of supply, making them occasional rice importers depending on
their production level. Other countries such as Singapore and Brunei are considered
as traditional purchasers of rice (Fig. 17.2).
3Own calculation based on FAOSTAT data. The shares are among cereals, in 2012.


















Fig. 17.3 ASEAN rice trade 2007–2011. Source: FAOSTAT
Table 17.1 ASEAN rice
trade balance 2011 (million
USD)
Country Import Export Net import
Brunei 39.6 2.0 37.6
Myanmar 1.6 98.5 96.9
Indonesia 1513.2 0.8 1512.3
Cambodia 4.9 107.9 103.1
Lao PDR 9.8 NA NA
Malaysia 606.1 0.4 605.7
Philippines 383.2 1.7 381.5
Singapore 284.3 52.6 231.6
Thailand 8.9 6507.5 6498.6
Vietnam 1.3 3656.8 3655.5
Source: FAOSTAT
The international rice market has been historically thin and unstable (Dawe and
Timmer 2012). The geographic concentration of rice production and the thinness
of international rice trade with high transactions costs are among the factors
contributing to its instability. Only about 5 % of the total global rice production
enters the international market, which is mostly concentrated in Asia. Southeast
Asia as a region is a net rice exporter (Fig. 17.3), but the bulk of the countries are
rice importers (Table 17.1).
ASEAN countries’ imports are mainly sourced from within the region. The
countries in this region absorb roughly one-third of the total regional exports and
send the excess rice supply to the rest of the world (Fig. 17.4).
The average rice tariff rates of ASEAN countries are relatively high compared
with other commodities. In 2012, the tariff for rice was 15.94 % on average among
ASEAN countries, which was much higher than the total average tariff rates for all
commodities (Table 17.2).
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Fig. 17.4 ASEAN rice trade flow 2011. Source: UN COMTRADE
Table 17.2 Average tariff






Source: TRAINS database accessed via WITS
Note: Average tariff rates not weighted, classi-
fication based on standard product in SITC
Southeast Asian countries liberalize their markets through regional and multi-
lateral trade agreements. The cooperation through ASEAN started in 1967, and
all ASEAN members are currently also members of the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO). Through the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA), which
supersedes the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) scheme implemented
in 1992, international trade within the region is almost without tariffs except for
certain sensitive commodities. In addition to bilateral cooperation between ASEAN
members and many other countries, the members also build cooperation with
neighboring countries while maintaining ASEAN centrality (Fig. 17.5). There are
AK-FTA (with Rep. Korea), AC-FTA (with China), AANZFTA (with Australia
and New Zealand), and AI-FTA (with India). Although the agreement of ASEAN
and Japan has not yet entered into force, many ASEAN members have already
established bilateral agreement with Japan. Furthermore, Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership (RCEP), which will combine ASEAN and their six partners,
is currently under negotiation.4 ASEAN itself is entering a new phase of stronger
cooperation through the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) in 2015.
4RCEP participating countries are ASEAN countries (Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos,
Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Philippines, Vietnam) plus their six partners (Australia, China,
India, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea), launched in November 2012.














Fig. 17.5 ASEAN free trade agreement. Source: WTO
Table 17.3 Tariff of selected agricultural product of different trade agreement regimes 2012 (%)
Commodity MFN applied ATIGA AKFTA ACFTA AANZFTA AIFTA
Animals & product 4.6 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.8 2.2
Dairy products 5.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 2.2
Fruit, vegetables, & plants 5.3 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.2 3.8
Coffee & tea 6.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 4.3
Cereals 11.8 7.1 7.3 7.3 7.7 10.1
Oil seeds, fats, & oils 4.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 2.3
Sugar 12.8 8.1 8.1 8.1 8.1 10.4
Cotton 4.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6
Other agriculture products 4.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 2.4
Source: WTO. Note: MFN most favoured nations, ATIGA ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement,
AK FTA ASEAN Korea FTA, AC FTA ASEAN China FTA, AANZFTA ASEAN Australia New
Zealand FTA, AI FTA ASEAN India FTA
However, despite having significantly reduced their tariffs on many commodities
through trade agreements among ASEAN members (and plus countries), consider-
ably high cereals tariffs are still in place (Table 17.3). Cereal products, especially
rice, are considered highly sensitive commodities in ASEAN, and thus ASEAN
countries still make exceptions by not reducing the tariff on these commodities.
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17.3 National Food Reserves in Southeast Asia
The fact that the international rice market has been historically thin and unstable
forced countries in this region to prevent the transmission of world price fluctuations
to domestic markets (Dawe and Timmer 2012; Rashid et al. 2007). Storage-based
public intervention policies have been part of their development agenda for many
years to control food availability in the market.
Food price stabilization in the Philippines is managed by the National Food
Authority (NFA), which acts as a regulator as well as a corporation engaged in
grain trading. The history of the NFA started in the 1960s, when the RICOB and
the RCA were still active. In 1972, the National Grains Authority (NGA) replaced
these two agencies to promote the integrated growth and development of the grain
industry in the country. In 1981, the NGA was transformed to the NFA, and the new
organization has two primary mandates: ensuring food security and stabilizing the
supply and price of rice. This highlighted the importance of rice in the society. The
NFA aimed to fulfill its mandates through procurement, distribution, importation,
and buffer stock activities. For the buffer stock activities, the NFA is required to
maintain rice stocks which are equivalent to 15 days of consumption for the entire
country in its warehouses (Aquino et al. 2013).
In Indonesia, price stabilization was managed by BULOG, a national food
reserve agency created in 1967 with the special objective to protect Indone-
sian domestic markets from sharp price fluctuations on world markets. BULOG
buys excess rice production that is not absorbed by the market during harvest
seasons from farmers, keeps the rice in its warehouses throughout the country,
and distributes the rice at low prices during planting seasons, drought, or other
conditions that may cause sharp increases in market rice prices. BULOG maintains
a ceiling price policy to ensure the affordability of rice for low-income consumers,
especially those living in urban areas. Like the NFA in the Philippines, BULOG also
monopolizes rice imports in Indonesia.
As rice importers, Indonesia and the Philippines mainly control rice imports.
Other countries, such as Vietnam, which is an exporter country, also use public
reserve policies to control rice exports. VINAFOOD in Vietnam is responsible for
managing rice availability and rice prices in the market.
17.3.1 Benefits and Costs of National Reserves
Although it is difficult to separate the contributions of policies, we have provided
some reviews and discussions on the costs and benefits of national food reserve
using qualitative approaches. Rashid et al. (2007) argued that storage-based price-
stabilization policies benefit countries through price stability and better agricul-
tural performance. Southeast Asian countries were among those that successfully




























































































Fig. 17.6 Rice prices in Indonesia during “New Order” and “Reform.” Source: Dawe (2008) and
GIEWS
managed their domestic food prices for years. Under the “New Order,”5 Indonesia
was one of the success stories of food price stabilization, especially for rice. From
1969 to 1997, domestic rice prices were substantially less volatile than in the
“reform”6 period after 1998, when BULOG has less power to intervene in the
market7 (see Fig. 17.6). In Vietnam, agricultural policies introduced in the early
phase of the unification of North and South Vietnam have transformed the country
with disappointing agricultural production to one of the biggest rice exporters in the
world.
Price stability benefits consumers and producers at the same time (Timmer
1989). Poor consumers in Southeast Asia, like many others in developing countries,
spend more than half of their income on food (von Braun and Tadesse 2012).
Excessive price volatility and spikes can cause food and nutrition insecurity for
those consumers who cannot maintain consumption stability. Reducing food and
nutrition intake, even only temporarily, can have short- and long-term effects (Block
et al. 2004). Price-stabilization policy serves as a preventive program instead of a
response program for emergency cases. This kind of policy can help consumers
better manage their expectations on food prices and thus better manage their food
and nutritional intake. Price stability also helps producers maintain consumption
stability because most farmers in Southeast Asia are also categorized as poor citizen
living in rural areas.
Furthermore, price stability allows farmers to better manage price expectations
on food crops, which can enhance efficiency in the farming sector through better
management of planting systems. Moreover, price stability contributes to social and
5“New Order” refers to the government lead by President Soeharto, in power from 1967 to 1998.
6“Reform” refers to democratization era in Indonesia after the lost power of Soeharto regime in
1998.
7Empirical test using standard deviations of log of prices in difference (SSD) shows 0.05 for the
periods before 1998 and 0.1 for the periods after 1998.
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political stability. Arezki and Brückner (2014) showed that price movements can
induce political instability, which is manifested in political riots and civil conflicts.
Sociopolitical instability can in turn make it difficult for governments to promote
growth and development.
Food price stability is in fact associated with the rapid economic growth during
the early development phase in Southeast Asia (Dawe and Timmer 2012; Cummings
et al. 2006). However, the downside of stabilization policies are that the fiscal costs
of public reserves are often high, while the benefits may not be as high as expected.
In the Philippines, for instance, the government spending on the NFA surpassed
its spending on agrarian reform, research and development, and extension services
during the period of 2003–2008 (Aquino et al. 2013). In Indonesia, a financial audit
report by Arthur Anderson covering the period from April 1993 to March 1998
suggested that total inefficiency of BULOG was about US$400 million per year
(Arifin 2008). Likewise, the economic costs of distorting market and crowding out
private storage and trade can also be very high.
Over decades, there have been several shifts in the price-stabilization policies in
Southeast Asia. In the 1980s and 1990s, public reserves fell out of favor particularly
because of the changing interest of many countries, which wanted to improve
market efficiency. Fiscal difficulties caused by the Asian crisis in the late 1990s
triggered countries in the region to intervene less in the market. Indonesia loosened
its monopolistic structure and created competition within the domestic market.
BULOG lost its domestic power to monopolize the sugar and rice trade because
Indonesia was required to comply with the International Monetary Foundation
(IMF) Letter of Intent by liberalizing its market.
17.4 Regional Food Reserve Cooperation
Following the global food price crisis in 2008, ASEAN countries agreed on the
ASEAN Integrated Food Security (AIFS) framework, which aimed to address four
major components of the food security challenges: food security arrangements and
emergency short-term relief, sustainable food trade development, integrated food
security information system, and agricultural innovation. The AIFS framework
provides the foundation for the establishment of the APTERR, an ASEAN regional
reserve cooperation together with its three partners.8 The APTERR was finally
agreed upon in October 2011 and entered into force in July 2012.
The history of the APTERR dates back to 1979, when the original members of
ASEAN9 agreed on the ASEAN Emergency Rice Reserve (AERR). The objective
was to build up physical rice reserves that would serve the needs of member
countries when the demand in any member country cannot be fulfilled from own
8China, Japan, and Rep. Korea.
9Five original members are: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand; current
ASEAN members also include Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.
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production or through purchases in international market. The main reason for
the cooperation was that the ASEAN countries identified food instability as a
common threat and as the consequence of the high vulnerability of the region’s
food production. The AERR was created with the initial earmarks of 50,000 tons of
rice as a subset of national stocks. Releases from the AERR were to be arranged
through bilateral negotiation between a country in a state of emergency and a
country offering its earmarked reserve. The system, however, was never used,
and the amount of rice in the reserve was too undersized to cope with an actual
emergency.
The efforts of building up stocks in the region continued. In 2001, ASEAN
countries, in partnership with China, Japan, and Korea, initiated a consultation and
cooperation process in establishing an emergency rice reserve at the regional level.
A pilot project of the East Asia Emergency Rice Reserve (EAERR) was created at
the end of 2003 with the political support of the ASEAN Plus Three countries. The
purpose of the EAERR is twofold: maintaining food security in case of emergency
and contributing toward price stability in the region (APTERR 2014). The food price
crisis in 2008 led the ASEAN Plus Three governments to strengthen the financial
and stockpiling abilities of the EAERR and move beyond the project beyond its pilot
phase. The APTERR was finally agreed upon as a permanent scheme in October
2011 and entered into force in July 2012.
The initial earmarked stock of the APTERR is 787,000 tons of rice, which were
voluntarily contributed by the member countries (Table 17.4). The stocks remain
owned and controlled by the respective governments for meeting the needs of any
other member countries in case of emergency. The governments are also responsible
for the management cost of their earmarked stocks to ensure the stocks remain in
Table 17.4 Earmarked
stock of APTERR


















17 ASEAN Food Reserve and Trade: Review and Prospect 423
good quality. Another type of APTERR stock is a stockpiled emergency rice reserve,
which could be in form of cash or rice, but is owned collectively by APTERR
member countries and managed by the APTERR secretariat under the supervision
of the APTERR council.10
The APTERR is designed to mainly address emergency situations anywhere in
the region. Emergency is defined as “the state or condition having suffered extreme
and unexpected natural or man-induced calamity, which is unable to cope with such
state or condition through its national reserve and is unable to procure the need
through normal trade.”11 In principle, given the definition of emergency, extreme
price volatility is not a reason for releasing rice from the APTERR.
The APTERR presents itself as a subset of national reserves. Rice release from
the APTERR is only possible when a national reserve is unable to cope with extreme
shocks. The release of APTERR stock is based on the request of the member
country which encounters an emergency rice shortage. The requesting country is
also responsible for the transportation and operational costs incurred during the
stock release.
The APTERR heavily relies on the commitment and political will of every
member country, without any sanction mechanism in place. Nevertheless, APTERR
member countries appoint a Management Team to ensure rice releases take place in
case of emergency.
17.4.1 The Benefits and Costs of Regional Reserves
There have been extensive debates on storage-based price-stabilization policies
(Galtier 2013). On the one hand, countries with public reserve policies can benefit
from price stability and better agriculture performances, which are associated with
economic success. On the other hand, the policies are often criticized for their high
fiscal and economic costs.
National public food reserves in Southeast Asia are largely managed as buffer
stocks to address price instability. The size of national public food reserves is usually
large, and their stocks are frequently rotated to maintain the quality of the stocks.
Consequently, the fiscal costs of storing food/grains are high, and the potential of
creating market distortion is high as a result of the high degree of intervention.
On the other hand, an emergency public reserve usually holds a low amount of
stocks and is only intended for addressing humanitarian needs rather than for price
stabilization.
In the competitive storage model, the central idea behind storing food today for
tomorrow’s consumption is based on the assumption that an equilibrium price can
be reached when today’s price (pt) equals the expected price tomorrow (ptC1) plus
the costs of storage. Stocks are held in anticipation of profit, which implies that the
10The APTERR council is composed of one representative from each APTERR member country.
11ASEAN Integrated Food Security Framework.
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marginal gain of holding stocks should exceed the marginal cost. However, under
this condition, the optimal stock level is not necessarily optimal from the social
welfare perspective.
Using this assumption, public involvement in stockholding is needed to address
the economy-wide consequences of demand or supply shocks. Difficulties arise
when determining the optimal stock level (Gardner 1979) as it depends on the
criterion of desirability. For instance, public rice stocks maintained by the NFA in
the Philippines are equivalent to 15-day consumption needs of the entire country
(Aquino et al. 2013). This stock level is determined based on the assumption that
the national stock level (public and private) should be equivalent to the 90-day
consumption needs, which covers the lean season, when usually no harvests from
domestic production prevail.
Notwithstanding the difficulties in determining the optimal stock level, we
provided an illustration on how regional cooperation can significantly reduce
the required stocks.12 Following Kornher and Kalkuhl (2014), we estimated the
required stocks as the difference between the largest historic supply shortfall and
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where x is the level of allowed supply shortfall. For instance, if we want to maintain
97 % consumption stability, then the allowed supply shortfall is 3 %. E(Qt) is
the expected supply level at time t. Since supply for consumption increases with
population growth, we measured shortfall around a trend.
Supply shortfalls of countries individually were compared with the total supply























is the coefficient of variation of the regional supply, and Qi
is the supply of each country. si and ri; iC1 are a country’s share and coefficient
of correlation, respectively. This condition assumes that there is free flow of food
between the countries within the region. Production shortfall can be compensated by
imports, which means that the supply shortfall in one country can be compensated
by supply surpluses in other countries.
12Further discussion on optimal stock level can be found in Kornher and Kalkuhl (2014).
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Table 17.5 Stocks required for allowed supply shortfall of 3 % (tons)














Brunei 1227 23.22 688 13.02 3000 56.76
Cambodia 47,768 12.95 26,799 7.27 3000 0.81
Indonesia 57,413 1.05 32,210 0.59 12,000 0.22
Lao PDR 18,912 10.73 10,610 6.02 3000 1.7
Malaysia 17,947 5.59 10,069 3.14 6000 1.87
Myanmar 34,552 2.37 19,385 1.33 14,000 0.96
Philippines 78,355 5.41 43,960 3.04 12,000 0.83
Singapore 10,420 23.28 5846 13.06 5000 11.17
Thailand 130,132 8.60 73,008 4.82 15,000 0.99
Vietnam 136,657 5.42 76,669 3.04 14,000 0.55
Plus Three
China 678,268 3.2 380,533 1.8 300,000 1.42
Japan 132,280 8.7 74,214 4.88 250,000 16.45
Korea 59,788 6.93 33,543 3.90 150,000 17.40
Total 1,403,717 3.81 787,535 2.14 787,000 2.14
Source: Own elaboration based on USDA PSD. Note: required stocks w/o cooperation and with
cooperation are calculated for 2 months consumption
Considering that not all of ASEAN countries are rice producers, supply data
(production C imports) was used instead of production data only. Rice supply in
Singapore, for instance, relies heavily on imports. Using the actual rice supply
data of ASEANC3 countries from the USDA PSD for the period of 1980–2014,
we estimated the required stocks for the 2-month consumption stability at 97 %
(allowed supply shortfall of 3 %). Countries’ stocks were determined from the
regional stocks using their consumption shares. The results of the estimations are
presented in Table 17.5.13
The simulations showed that regional cooperation can significantly reduce the
required rice stock by roughly 44 %, from 1,403,717 to 787,535 tons. This
implies that the fiscal costs associated with holding stocks can be reduced through
cooperation and risks sharing. The simulations also showed that all countries can
reduce the required contributions of stocks through regional risk sharing.
In the APTERR system, stocks remain owned and controlled by the respective
governments for the purpose of meeting the needs of any other APTERR member
countries when they experience an emergency. However, transportation costs arise
when transferring rice from a donor country to a country in need. This transportation
costs should also be taken into consideration when calculating the cost reduction
13Correlation matrix of supply shortfall, maximum shortfall, average annual supply, and consump-
tion shares that were used for the estimations are available in Appendix.
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Table 17.6 Storage and transportation cost (million USD)
Storage cost Transportation cost Total cost
Low High Low High Low High
w/o cooperation 35 49 – – 35 49
With cooperation 20 28 0.7 1.1 20.7 29.1
Cost savings 14.3 19.9
Source: own elaboration. Note: Storage cost is estimated in the range of US$25 (low) to US$35
(high) per ton. Transportation cost within ASEANC3 countries is estimated in the range of US$10
(low) to 15 (high) per ton
resulting from cooperation. Since transportation costs arise only when a country
within the region experiences a shortfall, we calculated the transportation costs
from the expected trade volume14 in times of shortfall, which was estimated to be
equal to the required stocks for 2 months consumption. The results are available in
Table 17.6.15
The total cost saving through food reserve cooperation was estimated to be
about US$14.3–19.9 million when storing enough food to satisfy consumption for
2 months. The saving is roughly 40 % of the estimated cost without cooperation.
The current APTERR stock is roughly equal to the total stocks needed by the
region to maintain consumption stability at 97 % for 2 months. However, the
voluntary contribution of each member country of the APTERR is not the same
as the required stock for each country with cooperation through risks sharing. For
instance, Japan and Korea contribute more than what they need, but Cambodia and
Lao PDR contribute less than their required stocks. Richer countries of the APTERR
are more likely to provide food assistance to their poorer neighboring countries. This
can be seen also from the voluntary contributions of APTERR member countries:
each of the “Plus Three” countries contributes more than the total contribution from
all ASEAN countries. There is a strong indication that the large contribution from
the “Plus Three” countries has brought APTERR into practice. Its predecessor, the
AERR, which consisted only of ASEAN members with small size of stock, had
never released its stock during its entire operational period.
We also conducted a simulation to determine the required stock for ensuring
consumption stability of 97 % in different cooperation regimes in order to analyze
whether countries benefit from larger cooperation (Table 17.7). Through our
simulation of three scenarios—ASEAN, ASEANC3, and ASEANC3 plus India—
we found that the benefits of cooperation decreased when more countries joined
the cooperation. This is possible because the correlation of shortfall risks increases
with the increasing number of member countries. However, although the benefits
of cooperation were decreasing, the required stock was still significantly reduced.
14The expected trade volume in times of shortfall is based on the mean value of the historical
regional shortfalls.
15Numbers of supply shortfall for each country are available in Appendix.
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cooperation Reduced by (%)
ASEAN 533,382 178,885 66
ASEANC3 1,403,717 787,535 44
ASEANC3CIndia 2,362,418 1,637,777 31
Source: Own elaboration based on USDA PSD
For instance, if India also joined the ASEANC3 cooperation, the required stock
would be reduced by 31 %. Moreover, larger cooperation means larger coordination
between countries, which can potentially prevent collective action failures.
17.5 WTO Rules on Public Reserve
The central issue in a WTO-compatible framework for developing countries,
including those in Southeast Asia, is whether these countries are able to stockpile
their staple food (i.e., rice) to ensure stable incomes for their farmers while ensuring
that their low-income citizens are able to access the basic food at an affordable
price. This issue, however, affects or has the potential to affect other countries.
The potential spillovers of public reserves are high in different member countries
due to different conditions of countries in ensuring food security for the citizens.
The increasing demand for food for stockholding purposes increases prices and
potentially reduces supply for immediate consumption in other countries. When
food stocks are finally released for consumption, international trade can be distorted,
affecting market competition.
The present WTO rules allow member countries to maintain or introduce
domestic support measures without any limitations or reduction commitments. To
qualify for this, domestic support to food reserves must meet “the fundamental
requirement that they have no, or at most minimal, trade distorting effect or effects
on production.”16 Countries, however, may argue the definition of minimal trade
distorting effects.
A public reserve is not only economically complex but also politically encum-
bered. The Bali Package, which has been mentioned as the first-ever agreement
reached in the history of the WTO, still makes an exception for public stockholding.
In the 9th ministerial meeting held in Bali, Indonesia, at the end of 2013, the
WTO member countries adopted an interim solution and agreed to negotiate a
permanent solution that would specifically address public reserve by the 11th
16WTO Agreement on Agriculture.
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ministerial conference in 2017. Furthermore, in the Post-Bali work, countries also
agreed to continue with the interim solution if the permanent solution cannot be
agreed upon by 2017. This means that no agreement has been reached for a public
reserve. Nevertheless, the interim solution, which should prevent countries from
challenging other countries through dispute settlement mechanism until a permanent
solution is found, can be a starting point for a new institutional arrangement to
prevent collective action failures of uncoordinated national public reserves, which
can further destabilize prices at the international level.
17.6 Conclusion and Policy Implication
Public food reserve policies have been used by many countries for decades.
Although in the 1980s and 1990s, public reserves fell out of favor with many
countries particularly against the backdrop of changing interest, with the countries
turning their attention to improving market efficiency, the policy has always been
part of the development agenda of many countries. Storage-based stabilization
policy through public food reserve is receiving much more attention today in the
era of increasing food price volatility. Food security concerns in the recent years
have led many countries to reconsider using public food reserve as the main policy
to deal with such uncertainty and price instability.
ASEAN countries have provided an interesting case with their long experience
in implementing storage-price-based stabilization policies. Despite the difficulties
in measuring the impact of different policies, price stabilization has been an
integral part of the development agenda of ASEAN countries for decades and has
contributed to price stability, which is associated with the economic successes in
this region. ASEAN also has shown that cooperation at the regional level is possible.
The APTERR presents itself as a regional effort to face the common challenges of
ensuring food security.
One of the main concerns regarding public reserve is that the fiscal cost of storing
food is relatively high. The cost, however, can be reduced with cooperation. The
simulations have shown that regional cooperation significantly reduces the required
stocks, which in turn reduces the costs of holding them. Even when transportation
cost arising because of decentralized storage in the different countries is taken
into account, the total cost for food reserve with cooperation is still lower than
without cooperation. This definitely will be beneficial for all participating countries.
Admittedly, determining the optimal stock level is difficult. It always depends on the
criterion of desirability. The current earmarked stock of the APTERR is designed
mainly to address emergency situation rather than for price stability. However, it
may have a calming effect on the market and thereby prevent the rapid increase in
food prices.
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ASEAN and their partner countries can also consider expanding their coopera-
tion to include other neighboring countries. The simulation which considered India
as the “fourth” country showed that such cooperation would still significantly reduce
the required stocks that will be beneficial for all member countries involved. India
was emphasized in the simulation because of its important role in the region. The
fact that the country is home to around 200 million undernourished people17 has
brought serious concerns to the policymakers in the country. With the world’s largest
food programs covering public procurement, storage, and distribution of wheat and
rice, India has successfully stabilized its food prices for many years. However, the
policies give rise to very high fiscal cost. In 2013, the cost is estimated to be around
1.2 % of the country’s GDP (Kozicka et al. 2015).
While India is not part of ASEAN Plus Three countries food reserve cooperation,
ASEAN and India have already signed an FTA, which has been in force since
January 2010. The countries involved could also consider including food reserve
as part of their cooperation which will likely be beneficial to all the participating
countries. In addition to reducing the overall fiscal costs, larger cooperation and
coordination also mean that collective action failures are diminished.
Learning from ASEAN case, public food reserve is an ancient idea that is still
relevant today. The way forward is to build institutional arrangements that facilitate
coordination and cooperation among countries through various channels, including
the multilateral trading system of the WTO. Each of the ASEAN trade agreements
with six countries18 which could be deepened under the RCEP framework, which
combines all ASEAN “plus” agreements together, and this could be a starting point
for a stronger and larger cooperation in various areas, including public reserves.
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Appendix
17Estimated from 17 % of population as stated in the Global Hunger Index, IFPRI et al. (2014).
18The six countries are Australia, China, India, Japan, Korea, and New Zealand.
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